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Abstract
Though African party systems are said to be ethnic, there is little evidence for this claim. The few empirical 
studies rarely rely on individual data and are biased in favour of Anglophone Africa. This paper looks at four 
Francophone countries, drawing on representative survey polls. Results reveal that ethnicity matters, but 
that its impact is generally rather weak and differs with regard to party systems and individual parties. ‘Ethnic 
parties’ in the strict sense are virtually absent. In particular, the voters’ location seems more important 
than ethnic affiliation. Other determinants such as regional ties, elite strategies, cross-cutting cleavages, and 
rational preferences deserve more attention in the future study of voting behaviour in Africa.
Keywords 
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Introduction
Despite a mixed balance sheet in terms of democratic quality, multiparty systems have obviously 
taken root in sub-Saharan Africa. As of mid-2009, many countries had witnessed more than four 
elections since 1990 and less than a handful of countries had not held at least one multiparty elec-
tion (see Lindberg, 2006). Yet, electoral violence in Kenya and other countries seemingly confirms 
that ethnic affiliation determines party preferences and that political parties tend to be ‘ethnic’.
The debate, however, has moved beyond these assumptions, and the relatively few empirical 
studies with a solid empirical foundation of country cases (e.g. Fridy, 2007; Lindberg and Morrison, 
2008) or a comparative perspective (e.g. Mozaffar et al., 2003; Norris and Mattes, 2003) paint a far 
more nuanced picture. Ethnicity often plays a role, but this role differs across countries and is just 
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one out of a number of factors (e.g. Cheeseman and Ford, 2008; Erdmann, 2007; Norris and Mattes, 
2003). In any case, the question remains: to what extent are sub-Saharan Africa’s party systems and 
related individual political preferences determined by ethnicity?
This article aims to contribute to this debate by looking at Francophone Africa – an area widely 
neglected by the Anglophone dominated literature (cf. Gazibo, 2006). It does not aim at explicitly 
comparing former French and British colonies, but at complementing and enriching the debate. 
The paper therefore draws on the data of four representative survey polls which were conducted 
between August and December 2006 by the GIGA Institute of African Affairs and African partners 
in Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. The polls were the first nationwide surveys with a par-
ticular focus on ‘political parties’ undertaken in these countries and provide data regarding the 
individual level which are particularly valuable for the analysis of party preference.
The paper starts with a discussion of the theoretical argument regarding ethnicity as a determinant 
of voting intentions in Francophone Africa and summarizes the rather sketchy empirical evidence on 
the topic thus far. We then outline our empirical strategy, which comprises two major approaches: 
First, we employ a multivariate quantitative approach (logistic regressions) in order to determine the 
general significance of ethnicity in explaining party preference. Second, we take a closer look at the 
major individual political parties in the four countries and assess whether and to what extent their 
support base is indeed ‘ethnic’ or rather ‘regional’. Third, we discuss the relative weight of ethnicity 
in the four party systems under investigation and try to find preliminary explanations for the differ-
ences between the cases. Finally, conclusions for theory and future research are drawn.
Current research
In the general debate on ethnicity in Africa, a purely essentialist or primordial notion of ethnicity 
has been widely abandoned in favour of an understanding that includes constructivist ideas. Ethnic 
identity results from differences in a variable set of identity markers such as language, religion, 
culture and the like (Chandra and Wilkinson, 2008; Horowitz, 1985), but finally ethnic identity is 
a matter of external and self-ascription (Kasfir, 1976; Lemarchand, 1972). Though being princi-
pally subject to manipulation and change, the ethnic identity of individuals does not change on a 
daily or arbitrary basis and usually remains stable over time.1 Moreover, if we conceptualize eth-
nicity as a group phenomenon which means more than a residential neighbourhood, we must not 
equate region and ethnic affiliation. The regional concentration of ethnic groups is a feature of 
certain, particularly rural areas, but is so, far less often than assumed and is apparently a declining 
feature in Africa (e.g. Bierschenk, 2006). 
How, then, is ethnicity related to political parties and the party system in Africa? Since all major 
theories on determinants of voting behaviour include social affiliations, ethnicity can be easily 
integrated. The micro-sociological approach argues that ‘a person thinks politically as he is socially’ 
(Lazarsfeld et al., 1968: 27), which can imply ethnic voting. The same holds true for the macro-
sociological cleavage approach (Erdmann, 2004; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967) or a sociopsychologi-
cal approach which conceptualizes party preferences as a product of social ties (Dalton and 
Wattenberg, 2000). Rational choice is compatible with ethnic voting because voting for a candidate 
with the same ethnic affiliation may be expected to best serve the voter’s interests.
Concerning African party systems, Horowitz’s (1985) seminal work on ethnic groups in conflict 
had a large impact on the scholarly discussion. He strongly reinforced the postcolonial suggestion 
that African parties were best conceptualized as ‘ethnic parties’. According to Horowitz, an ‘ethnic 
party’ receives at least 85 per cent of its support from one single ethnic group.2 When party research 
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on Africa regained momentum in the late 1990s, a number of studies – not in strict operational terms 
but relying conceptually on Horowitz – named ethnic parties and ethnic party systems as a typical 
feature of African politics. The assumption that party systems were a mere function of ethnic 
 demography, however, could hardly be reconciled with the mushrooming of dominant parties in many 
highly ethnically heterogeneous countries (Erdmann, 2004). Dominant parties often won vast absolute 
majorities which were in sharp contrast with the respective ethnic composition of the countries.
For Francophone Africa, Fomunyoh (2001) distinguishes between government parties which 
mobilize broad-based support throughout society and opposition parties which tend to rely heavily 
on ethnic or regional bases of support. This distinction suggests two conclusions. First, there is a 
need to question how common ethnic parties really are if large ruling parties are different. Second, 
parties and party systems are different phenomena. An ‘ethnicized’ or ‘ethnically dominated’ party 
system certainly consists of ‘ethnicized’ parties.3 Yet, the role of ethnicity can only be assessed by 
evaluating the extent of ethnicization of individual parties. An ‘ethnicized party system’ implies 
that the whole system is at least considerably structured by ethnicity, and this, in turn, suggests an 
ethnically determined cleavage which mirrors a mutually exclusive ‘them against us’.
Individual party typologies
The universal typology of political parties by Gunther and Diamond (2003) includes two types of 
political parties based principally on ethnic support: the ‘ethnic party’, which draws support from 
one single ethnic group, and an ‘ethnic congress party’, which tries to build a winning coalition of 
different ethnic electorates. In contrast to mono-ethnic parties, ethnic congress parties rely on eth-
nic alliances but still divide into ethnically disjoint alliances. In other words, one coalition, C1, of 
ethnic groups largely supports one party, P1, and a disjoint coalition, C2, of other ethnic groups 
largely supports another party, P2. By consequence, dominance on the part of such parties leads to 
ethnicized party systems. According to Gunther and Diamond, such congress parties ‘may take the 
form of a single, unified party structure’ (p. 184); this leaves unanswered the questions of how we 
know precisely when a party is an ethnic congress party and why we need to distinguish such par-
ties from other forms of dominant or even unitary parties.
A classification of 41 parties from 13 countries – including only two Francophone countries – 
underlines the fact that the number of ‘ethnic parties’ in Africa is limited to eight parties if we 
employ Horowitz’s (1985) 85 per cent threshold (Cheeseman and Ford, 2007). Still, a majority of 
the 41 parties’ support bases seem to be dominated by one ethnic group which accounts for more 
than 50 per cent of the party’s voters. This may point to a strong dependence by one party on the 
support of one specific ethnic group. However, is this enough to declare a party ‘ethnic’ or ‘multi-
ethnic’ as Horowitz does? In fact, it remains unclear whether such an ethnic support base expresses 
an ethnic cleavage in society or is simply a reflection of society’s average composition. The total 
number of Botswana’s parties, for instance, accounts for three of the eight so-called ‘ethnic parties’ 
in the study. This is hardly surprising, since all of these parties draw their main support from 
Botswana’s 85 per cent majority group, the Batswana. Unless we control for society’s overall 
 composition, these shares have limited meaning.
Party-system approaches
For about a decade, solid empirical studies have raised doubts about earlier assumptions regarding 
the central role of ethnicity in African party systems. On a national aggregate level, Mozaffar et al. 
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(2003) distinguish between regionalism and ethnicity by including the geographic concentration of 
ethnic groups in their macroanalysis of African party systems. They find that the interaction of 
ethnic fragmentation, geographic concentration, and electoral district magnitude is key to explain-
ing party-system fragmentation. The results are certainly most interesting in terms of the structure 
of party systems, but they tell us little about the question of to what extent the respective parties are 
really ‘ethnic’ in nature and, hence, whether we were right to speak of ‘ethnic party systems’. 
Another study tests for the degree of uneven distributions in cross-tabulations of ethnic affiliation 
and party preferences in order to measure the ethnicization of the party system (Dowd and Driessen, 
2007). However, it does not control for the importance of ethnicity at the level of individual 
parties.
The only cross-national study based on individual data known to the authors which explicitly 
focuses on the relation of specific ethnic groups and specific political parties is that of Norris and 
Mattes (2003). According to them, ethnic voting takes place and proves significant in more than 
two-thirds of the 12 cases under consideration. However, their analysis is limited to the biggest 
ethnic group in relation to the respective country’s biggest ruling party; ethnicity is just one among 
several other significant determinants and only one Francophone country is included.
Single-country studies
The limitations of the database are a common problem in the study of party systems in Africa, 
particularly in terms of cross-national studies. A number of recent studies hence focus on country 
cases in which more detailed data is available. However, these studies cover an astonishingly nar-
row selection of examples. Ghana and Zambia seem to be the best explored party systems on the 
continent. In contrast to these two Anglophone cases, most other countries, especially Francophone 
countries, remain virtually ignored.
Country studies differ with regard to their use of data. Most follow an ethnoregional approach 
and base their analysis on constituency-level election results. Assumptions about the ethnic affili-
ation of parties are usually drawn from the origin of party leaders, the range of party activity,4 and 
– less frequently – campaign rhetoric (e.g. Mayrargue, 2004). Beyond the risk of the ‘ecological 
fallacy’ of aggregate electoral data, ethnoregional approaches are much easier for researchers to 
employ in pluralist electoral systems with single-member constituencies (first past the post). If a 
particular party wins most or all constituencies in one region, these studies conclude that this party 
must have an ethnic support base – presuming that this region’s population is mainly composed of 
one particular ethnic group. In contrast, electoral data from proportional representation systems 
with larger constituencies is far more difficult to interpret, since a mixed ethnic electorate is much 
more likely.
The analytic advantages of pluralist systems may have fostered the abundance of studies on 
Ghana and Zambia. However, results from these two cases are anything but undisputed (cf. 
Erdmann, 2007). Drawing on comparably limited survey data for Ghana, one can obviously either 
conclude that ‘clientelistic and ethnic predisposed voting are minor features’ (Lindberg and 
Morrison, 2008: 34) or that ‘ethnicity is an extremely significant although not deciding factor in 
Ghanaian elections’ (Fridy, 2007: 302).
Studies on Zambia may have yielded results more consistent with ethnic voting. Nevertheless, 
conclusions vary between strong support for the ethnicity-party nexus and more cautious state-
ments. Findings oscillate between a reinforcement of the tradition of ‘multiethnic parties based on 
shifting ethnopolitical coalitions’ since 1990 (Scarritt, 2006: 253) and a moderate decrease 
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in ethnic voting since the change from one-party to multiparty elections (Posner, 2007). While 
country experts generally agree on the ethnic appeal of Zambia’s political parties, it is rather dif-
ficult to support the qualitative impression with the help of survey data (Erdmann, 2007). 
Findings from South Africa, where ethnic cleavages should be neither ignored nor overempha-
sized (McLaughlin, 2007); or the former Zaire,5 where a confrontation between two large regional 
groups – interpreted as ethnic regionalism – leads to significant correlation with the support for 
opposition parties (Emizet, 1999); or pre-war Côte d’Ivoire, where the debate on Ivorian national-
ity politicized and deepened ethnic divisions (Crook, 1997), affirm that Africa is obviously not 
very homogenous when it comes to ethnic voting. Marcus and Ratsimbaharison (2005) prefer to 
use types such as ‘catch-all’ or ‘elite-personalistic’ to describe Madagascar’s principal political 
parties. Hence, the strong evidence for ethnic voting recently found in Kenya (Bratton and Kimenyi, 
2008; Elischer, 2008) appears exceptional rather than typical of voting patterns in Africa.
Studies driven less by empirical data generally tend to make the ethnic argument stronger 
(Manning, 2005; Marty, 2002; Mustapha, 2004; Scarritt, 2006). On the other hand, some of the rare 
studies on parties in Francophone Africa manage to treat the topic without referring once to eth-
nicity (Baudais and Chauzal, 2006; Buijtenhuijs, 1994; Santiso and Loada, 2003).
Summarizing the review of relevant research findings, we may say that the number of studies 
on ethnicity as a determinant of party preference in Africa is still very limited and that this holds 
particularly true for studies using survey data on the individual level. The few studies in existence 
usually face two challenges: first, they find that ethnicity is only one factor amongst others, but 
they fail to determine the exact weight of ethnicity in the respective party systems; second, the 
rather sketchy knowledge thus far is deeply biased in favour of Anglophone Africa.
Empirical strategy
There has been a lively debate on how to adequately measure ethnicity and its impact on political 
processes at the national aggregate level (Chandra and Wilkinson, 2008; Posner, 2004). However, 
data on the individual level are best-suited to explore the link between ethnicity and party prefer-
ence. In order to integrate the different approaches discussed in the previous section, we employ a 
multistep analysis combining multivariate regression models and bivariate descriptive statistics 
drawn from survey polls.
The surveys and the database
The four representative survey polls were conducted in Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. 
Though the four cases are of course not representative of all the 14 Francophone countries in 
Africa, the sample includes cases with relatively similar conditions. We have aimed to select cases 
that share many important similarities but demonstrate differences with regard to the characteristics 
of the party system. While the cases differ with regard to party-system fragmentation (Benin: highly 
fragmented; Burkina: dominant; Mali: formerly dominant; Niger: moderately fragmented), the 
countries systematically share a wide range of socioeconomic, historical, and political similarities. 
As former French colonies that became independent in 1960, they all lapsed into authoritarianism 
after independence, which resulted in single-party regimes. Moreover, the military played a key 
role in politics until the democratization processes of the early 1990s led to the institutionalization 
of multiparty politics. In socioeconomic terms all four countries are among the poorest nations on 
earth, ranking at the very bottom of the Human Development Index. Consequently, they have had 
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to accept structural reforms and have been struggling with them since their introduction. Finally, 
all the countries are ethnically fairly diverse with high levels of ethnic fractionalization.6 
Each survey comprises a sample of at least 1000 respondents of voting age, all of whom were 
selected according to a two-step procedure. First, the selection was stratified in relation to regions, 
urbanization and gender. Second, respondents were randomly selected down to the individual level.
The questionnaires consisted of around 50 questions, including several items intended to mea-
sure the independent variables. As regards ethnicity, respondents were asked to name their ethnic 
affiliation,7 which captures the aspect of self-ascription fairly well. All the involved scholars from 
Africa and Europe agreed that this survey question is not offensive. However, we employed a 
 control question asking for the language spoken most regularly in daily life.8 Answers to both 
 questions correlate strongly.9
We also asked respondents about their identification with a party and which party they intended 
to vote for if there were elections soon. Other questions covered pertinent sociocultural and demo-
graphic characteristics, such as age or education, as well as attitudes vis-à-vis the political system, 
such as satisfaction with the incumbent government, which can capture rational behaviour.
In order to allow for meaningful statistical analysis, the number of individual political parties 
had to be limited to those with at least 50 respondents claiming their intention to vote for them. 
This resulted in two to four parties for each country case, and a total of 13 political parties to come 
under investigation.10 In any case, the selected parties represent at least two-thirds of those respon-
dents intending to vote (abstention excluded).
A multistep analysis
Theoretically, a party system can be characterized as strongly ethnicized when two conditions are 
met. First, ethnicity has to be a major determinant of party preference at the party-system level, 
even when important social and attitudinal characteristics are controlled for. For this analysis we 
employ a multivariate approach (binary logistic regressions) using the survey data. Second, an 
ethnic party system should comprise a majority of individual parties that are – or come close to – 
what the debate has called ‘ethnic parties’ (Cheeseman and Ford, 2007; Horowitz, 1985). The ideal 
‘ethnic party’ is a party whose electorate is entirely or at least overwhelmingly composed by one 
out of several ethnic groups and whose electorate significantly differs from the country’s (hetero-
geneous) ethnic composition. In order to determine the degree of ethnicization of individual par-
ties, we identify the percentage shares of ethnic groups among the supporters of the individual 
parties and systematically assess their deviation from the general ethnic composition of the society. 
Moreover, we calculate the likelihood that a member of the dominant ethnic support group intends 
to vote for the respective party rather than for any other one. Taking these three indicators together, 
we assess the overall level of ethnicization of the party in question. In order to control for a com-
peting explanation we repeat the same exercise for the degree of regionalization by substituting 
ethnic affiliation by residence in a particular region. Finally, the results of all individual parties are 
aggregated and evaluated at the country party-system and cross-national level.
The role of ethnicity in multivariate regressions
Multivariate regression models11 allow for the detection of the most important variables for party 
preference, which we measure as voting intention.12 In order to avoid the risk of overestimating the 
role of ethnicity, we control for a set of ten possible determinants: besides ethnic affiliation we 
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include geographic region, urban residence, formal education, age, gender, religious affiliation, 
satisfaction with one’s personal economic situation and with the government in general as well as 
democratic attitude.13 Since it is evidently impossible to measure party preference, ethnic affilia-
tions, and regions on an ordinal scale, we use multiple binary logistic regression models to assess 
the determinants of voting intentions for each political party.14
The full regression models in which we entered all the abovementioned variables – shown in 
Table 1 – allow the following main observations with regard to the role of ethnicity. First, for 
nine out of 13 political parties ethnicity proves significant, though in four cases only at the 10 
per cent level. Second, the relevance of ethnicity varies across countries. While there are only 
relatively weak significant findings in Benin and only slightly stronger results in Burkina Faso 
and Mali, all four parties in Niger show at least one significant ethnic variable at the 5 per cent 
level. 
Third, ‘region’15 clearly outperforms ‘ethnicity’. In 11 out of 13 cases there are significant rela-
tionships most often at least at the 5 per cent level (in seven cases even at the 1 per cent level with 
strong effects). Due to the obviously competing explanatory power of ‘ethnicity’ and ‘region’ we 
tested all party models with and without ‘region’ and ‘ethnicity’ respectively. Generally, Nagelkerke’s 
pseudo-R2 values increased substantially when we included region regardless of whether replacing 
ethnicity or adding the variable to the models.16 In five cases (RB, PRD, PSD, CDP, UNIR/MS) 
ethnicity turns insignificant when controlling for region while merely in the case of the Nigerien 
CDS region does it become insignificant when entering ethnicity. 
Concentrating on ‘region’ and ‘ethnicity’, however, we should not forget that other variables 
proved significant as well, pointing to rationalist voting behaviour or classical socio-structural 
determinants, particularly ‘satisfaction with the government’ (seven cases), ‘education level’ (six 
cases) and ‘urban residence’ (five cases). Finally, the general explanatory power of the models 
seems to vary as well: though it is difficult to assess the overall explanatory value of the logit 
 models by looking at pseudo-R2 values, the voting intentions for Malian and the larger Nigerien 
parties seem to be either more arbitrary than science can capture or based on other factors beyond 
what the model can cover.17
Ethnicization of support bases
The fact that ethnicity significantly contributes to predicting voting intentions for several parties 
does not necessarily mean that the whole party system is mainly structured by ethnic cleavages. 
Multivariate statistics help to determine the general significance of ethnicity and other variables 
but they tell us little about the scope of impact, particularly the following research questions: Are 
there parties that meet the criteria of an ‘ethnic’ or an ‘ethnic congress party’? To what extent are 
party systems composed by such parties, and where do we then deal with ‘ethnicized party 
systems’? 
For instance, in Niger, it is correct in statistical terms that Djerma-Songhai intend significantly 
less to vote for CDS or PNDS, and significantly prefer ANDP and MNSD (see Table 1). However, 
this does not automatically mean that ANDP or MNSD are ethnic Songhai parties; nor does it indi-
cate that the Nigerien party system is structured mainly along ethnic lines. Indeed, the appearance 
of two-party models which show a significant preference for the same ethnic group points to com-
petition for Songhai votes. This obviously stands in contrast to a clear-cut ethnic cleavage in soci-
ety. Hence, we employ three simple analytic control tools on the basis of absolute frequency 
distributions in the support bases of the parties under investigation. 
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First, following Horowitz and others, we examine the ethnic composition of the respective 
group of survey respondents who intended to vote for the party (subsequently referred to as ‘sup-
porters’). In other words, we detect the largest ethnic group among the party’s supporters.
Second, we take into account the general ethnic composition of the respective society in order 
to avoid the ‘Botswana problem’ cited above. Using a measure of proportionality, we may better 
estimate whether the ethnic composition of the supporters mirrors that of the society. Following 
Gallagher (1991), we calculate a least squares index which theoretically runs from 0 to 1, where 0 
would indicate a perfect ethno-demographic proportionality of society and supporters and a value 
of .5 would signify a party system perfectly structured along an ethnic cleavage. The logic of the 
index can be illustrated by an ideal two-party system with an equal share of 50 per cent of votes for 
both parties in a society composed of two numerically equal ethnic groups. If both parties received 
half of their votes from the two ethnic groups respectively, perfect proportionality would be reached 
and the index value would be .0 for both parties. In contrast, if both parties received 100 per cent 
of their respective votes from one of the ethnic groups, that is to say if ethnic entity E1 exclusively 
supported party P1 and group E2 exclusively supported party P2, the value would be .5 for both 
parties.
Third, Horowitz (1985) reminds us of the double perspective one can take on ethnic voting. 
From the party perspective, the ethnic composition of the party’s supporters may suffice to identify 
the ethnic character of this individual party. From the perspective of the ethnic group, one has to 
look at the party preferences of the entire ethnic group. The support base of a party can be over-
whelmingly composed by one group whereas this ethnic group’s members do not exclusively – or 
not even predominantly – vote for this particular party. We need to know the probability with 
which a member of the largest support group prefers the respective party.
Consequently, we assess the overall degree of ethnicization in three dimensions: (1) If a party’s 
largest ethnic support group accounts for less than 50 per cent of all supporters, this will be a first 
indicator of weak ethnicization, whereas a party with more than two-thirds of support coming from 
one ethnic group is strongly ethnicized. This threshold is below Horowitz’s 85 per cent and, thus, 
is in favour of the ethnicity argument. A share between 50 per cent and 66.7 per cent will indicate 
medium ethnicization. (2) We consider values of the proportionality index above .25 – half of the 
possible maximum – as ‘strong’, while values below .125 point to a weak ethnic support base. 
Again, values between these thresholds indicate the assessment ‘medium’. (3) The ethnic character 
of the party is considered weak unless it is at least two times likelier that a member of this ethnic 
group votes for the party in question than for any other one. Thus, a ‘likelihood’ value below 2.0 is 
a third indicator of weak ethnicization and a value above 3.0 indicates strong ethnicization, while 
values in between once again denote a medium degree.
The values of all three measurements are summarized in a simple index (each ‘weak’ = 0, each 
‘medium’ = 1, and each ‘strong’ = 2) and again transferred into qualitative assessments (0–1 = 
weak, 2–4 = medium, and 5–6 = strong ethnicization). A strongly ethnicized party is thus character-
ized by the following: a support base which is composed to at least two-thirds by one ethnic group, 
an ethnic composition that strongly deviates from the ethnic demography of the country, and a 
three times greater probability that a member of this ethnic group is willing to vote for this party 
rather than for any other one.
Table 2 reveals that 7 out of 13 parties – including at least one case from each country – are 
parties with a weak degree of ethnicization. Only three parties have a strongly ethnicized support 
base (PSD/Benin, RB/Benin, and ANDP/Niger). The remaining three parties (PRD/Benin, ADF-
RDA/Burkina, and CDS/Niger) demonstrate a medium degree of ethnicization. Values and overall 
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assessments are surprisingly clear-cut. It is only in the case of the PNDS in Niger that some of the 
indicators and values may come close to a medium degree of ethnicization. However, if we had 
employed Horowitz’s 85 per cent threshold, just one party – the RB in Benin – would have met the 
criterion. Moreover, in the case of Benin’s PSD, ethnic variables do not add significant explanatory 
value in the multivariate model. Thus, the bivariate control assessment should not be overempha-
sized since it may overrate ethnicity in relation to other factors.
Evidently, our indicators are primarily designed to detect monoethnic parties. However, ‘ethnic 
congress parties’ can also be captured. Although such parties appeal to more than one ethnic group, 
their multiparty support base must be exclusive in terms of a number of ethnic groups to make sense 
of the concept. Otherwise it would be hard to distinguish them from non-ethnic parties. Consequently, 
an ethnic congress party will display lower values in ‘shares’ and more moderate values in ‘proportion-
ality’, but ‘likelihood’ should still indicate high values for exclusive ethnic congress parties. However, 
first, we do not find (otherwise) weakly ethnicized parties with high ‘likelihoods’ and, second, all par-
ties whose ethnic support base is less than ‘strong’ share their largest ethnic group of supporters with 
other relevant parties. Apparently, the sample does not include ethnic congress parties.
To what extent are party systems composed of individual parties with ethnicized support bases? 
Since party systems are about interparty relations and the relative size of political parties, the 
Table 2. Level of Ethnicization in Support Bases of Major Political Parties
Party Share of 
party’s 
support 
among all 
respondentsa
Largest ethnic 
group among 
supporters
Proportionality 
indexb,c
Likelihood of 
ethnic supportb,d
Overall degree 
of ethnicization 
of supportb
Name Shareb
Benin
FCBE 23.6% Fon 41.2% (0) 0.10 (0) 0.70 (0) Weak (0)
RB 18.4% Fon 86.0% (2) 0.28 (2) 6.13 (2) Strong (6)
PRD 15.9% Fon 67.6% (2) 0.14 (1) 2.07 (1) Medium (4)
PSD 9.7% Adja 64.7% (1) 0.41 (2) 10.50 (2) Strong (5)
Burkina Faso
ADF/RDA 7.1% Mossi 71.4% (2) 0.14 (1) 2.16 (1) Medium (4)
CDP 78.3% Mossi 54.1% (1) 0.02 (0) 1.02 (0) Weak (1)
UNIR/MS 7.7% Mossi 50.0% (0) 0.07 (0) 0.86 (0) Weak (0)
Mali
ADEMA 44.8% Bambara 21.7% (0) 0.05 (0) 0.92 (0) Weak (0)
RPM 19.3% Bambara 25.2% (0) 0.06 (0) 1.11 (0) Weak (0)
Niger
ANDP 7.8% Djerma-
Songhai
74.3% (2) 0.44 (2) 10.31 (2) Strong (6)
CDS 15.7% Hausa 78.0% (2) 0.21 (1) 2.93 (1) Medium (4)
MNSD 42.5% Hausa 44.9% (0) 0.08 (0) 0.67 (0) Weak (0)
PNDS 24.7% Hausa 66.1% (1) 0.12 (0) 1.60 (0) Weak (1)
a Share of voting intentions among those respondents willing to vote.
b Ethnicization index value in parentheses (all columns). For operationalization see main text.
c Proportionality of ethno-demographic shares among the party support base and among all respondents.
d Likelihood that a member of the strongest ethnic group among the supporters of the party in question favours this 
party over all other parties.
Source: Authors’ compilation based on GIGA survey polls, 2006
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relative weight of the parties in the party systems has to be taken into account. Table 3 sums up the 
shares of moderately or strongly ethnicized parties (‘medium’ or ‘strong’) per country and also 
includes the shares of parties not under investigation due to statistical reasons (labelled ‘undeter-
mined’). Although we measured rather in favour of the ethnicity hypothesis, the results clearly 
show that only the party system of Benin tends to be dominated by ethnicized parties and, there-
fore, has a potentially ethnicized party system. The results for Niger are ambiguous, but the party 
systems of Burkina Faso and Mali are clearly dominated by parties with weak ethnic support bases; 
their party systems cannot reasonably carry the label ‘ethnicized’.
Given the prominent role of ‘region’ in the multivariate regressions we controlled for the ‘region-
alization’ of the support bases of political parties. Identical procedures as detailed above were 
applied except that we replaced ethnic groups by administrative subunits below the central state. 
Results confirm that region outperforms ethnicity as a determinant of party support (see Table 4).
While seven parties showed a rather weak overall ‘ethnicization’, there are only four parties that 
show weak ‘regionalization’ (CDP, MNSD, ADEMA and RPM). The majority of seven parties 
display ‘medium regionalization’ compared with only three parties with medium ‘ethnicization’. 
‘Strong regionalization’ produces somewhat more ambiguous results since this applies only to two 
parties (ANDP and PSD) – one less than with ethnic support bases – due to findings on the RB, 
which is strongly ethnicized but only moderately regionalized (all other cases showing equal or 
stronger results for regionalization). At the party-system level, however, regional support bases are 
stronger than ethnic ones (Table 3). Especially in Benin and Niger the ratio of medium and strong 
regionalization increases substantially when compared to the level of ‘ethnicization’ (68 vs. 44 per 
cent and 48 vs. 25 per cent). In Burkina Faso, the ratio doubles, though remaining at about 15 per 
cent only. It is just Mali where no indications can be found that there is either a substantial ethnic 
or regional support base of the parties. This also reminds us that it would be misleading to speak of 
‘regionalist parties’ all over the place. Regional support seems higher in general, but few parties are 
‘regionalist’ in the strict sense. 
Explaining differences
Both in the multivariate regressions and the bivariate analysis, ‘region’ outperforms ‘ethnicity’. 
Region is significant in 11 out of 13 cases – ethnicity only in 9 – and often at higher levels of sig-
nificance. In a number of cases ethnicity becomes insignificant when controlling for region. 
Regional support bases are generally at least equal and frequently stronger than ethnic ones, some-
thing which is also mirrored at the party-system level. But what does explain the higher salience of 
region vis-à-vis ethnicity? One promising explanation is that ties between voters and parties may 
Table 3. Degree of Ethnicization and Regionalization at the Party-system Level
Ethnicization/
Regionalizationa
Benin Burkina Faso Mali Niger
Medium or strong 44.0% / 67.6%  7.1% / 14.8%  0.0% / 0.0% 23.5%/48.2%
Undetermined 32.4%  6.9% 35.9%  9.3%
Weak 23.6% / 0.0% 86.0% / 78.3% 64.1% / 64.1% 67.2% / 42.5%
a The table shows the cumulative shares of parties per national party system distinguished by their degree of 
ethnicization and regionalization. ‘Undetermined’ is the share of parties which could not be included in statistical tests 
because of their low number of supporters. These shares are identical for ethnicization and regionalization.
 at Leibniz Inst Globale und Regionale Studien on February 3, 2014ips.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Basedau and Stroh 19
not work so much through common ethnic identity as through geographical proximity (cf. Stroh, 
2010). Party leaders may rely on personal networks in their region of origin. These networks may 
include distributional mechanisms from which regional residents will probably benefit more than 
ethnic kinsmen in other regions. This would also be consistent with the observation that the most 
popular – yet rarely realized – campaign pledges in Africa refer to local infrastructure such as roads 
and school buildings. 
Another important question arises from the differences between country cases, that is, the party 
systems. Why are the party systems of Benin and Niger substantially more ethnicized or regional-
ized than those in Burkina Faso and, particularly, Mali? Although a thorough investigation is 
beyond the scope of this paper we will discuss some tentative explanations.
First, these differences may be due to path dependence. While differences in the levels of ethni-
cization and regionalization are certainly not a function of demographics – the level of ethnic 
fractionalization is fairly similar in all countries – ethnicity has been markedly more strongly 
politicized in postcolonial Benin and Niger than in Burkina Faso and Mali. Benin’s postcolonial 
history until the early 1970s can be described as a permanent political struggle among three ethni-
cized but mainly regionalist groups (roughly, South-east, South-west, North). This was interrupted 
only by the authoritarian balancing of regional representation under President Kérékou’s militaro-
marxist regime, which eventually collapsed into an even more fragmented party system after 1990. 
Table 4. Level of Regionalization in Support Bases of Major Political Parties
Party Share of 
party’s 
support 
among all 
respondentsa
Largest regional group 
among  supporters
Proportionality  
indexb,c
Likelihood 
of regional 
supportb,d
Overall 
degree of 
regionalization 
of supportbName Shareb
Benin
FCBE 23.6% Atakora-Donga 25.5% (0) 0.16 (1) 2.44 (1) Medium (2)
RB 18.4% Zou 31.8% (0) 0.23 (1) 3.56 (2) Medium (3)
PRD 15.9% Ouémé 42.3% (0) 0.26 (2) 5.38 (2) Medium (4)
PSD 9.7% Couffo 57.4% (1) 0.39 (2) 17.69 (2) Strong (5)
Burkina Faso 
ADF/RDA 7.1% Nord 19.6% (0) 0.15 (1) 2.33 (1) Medium (2)
CDP 78.3% Boucle du 
Mouhoun
15.9% (0) 0.06 (0) 1.27 (0) Weak (0)
UNIR/MS 7.7% Centre 30.0% (0) 0.22 (1) 5.34 (2) Medium (3)
Mali
ADEMA 44.8% Kayes** 19.8% (0) 0.08 (0) 1.34 (0) Weak (0)
RPM 19.3% Bamako 22.2% (0) 0.11 (0) 2.24 (1) Weak (1)
Niger
ANDP 7.8% Dosso 74.3% (2) 0.48 (2) 17.78 (2) Strong (6)
CDS 15.7% Zinder 40.4% (0) 0.19 (1) 2.81 (1) Medium (2)
MNSD 42.5% Tillabéri 23.1% (0) 0.06 (0) 1.77 (0) Weak (0)
PNDS 24.7% Tahoua 36.8% (0) 0.16 (1) 2.68 (1) Medium (2)
a Share of voting intentions among those respondents willing to vote.
b Regionalization index value in parentheses (all columns). For operationalization see main text.
c Proportionality of regio-demographic shares among the party support base and among all respondents.
d Likelihood that a member of the strongest regional group among the supporters of the party in question favours this 
party over all other parties.
Source: Authors’ compilation based on GIGA survey polls, 2006
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In Niger, the Djerma-Songhai dominated the Hausa and other groups until the political opening in 
the early 1990s. The French had favoured the Djerma over the majoritarian Hausa. The one-party 
regime from 1960 to 1974 and the military regime after the 1974 coup were both led by Djerma, 
who favoured Djerma kinsmen over other groups.
Large N datasets (PREG by Posner, 2004; EPR by Cederman et al., 2009) and relevant case 
studies (e.g. Banégas, 2003; Boudon, 1997; Dunning and Harrison, 2010) reveal that the politiciza-
tion of ethnicity and the political exclusion of ethnic groups after independence were stronger in 
Benin and Niger than in Mali and Burkina Faso. In Burkina Faso, the PREG value is 0, and no 
excluded ethnic group can be identified for the period since independence. In Mali ethnic tensions 
derive exclusively from the Tuareg conflict, which can be described as a rather peripheral conflict 
in the country.
Another possible explanation refers to the transition processes in the early 1990s (Bratton and 
van de Walle, 1997). The founding elections resulted in different party systems. In both Mali 
(ADEMA) and Burkina Faso (CDP) dominant parties emerged which – in the absence of a demo-
graphically dominant ethnic group – had to appeal to a multiethnic following if they wanted to 
maintain their leading position, which in both cases had emerged out of a pre-existing political 
movement (see Boudon, 1997; Villalón and Idrissa, 2005). In contrast, in Benin and Niger no 
political organization active in the transition period managed to transform into a dominant party 
with large absolute majorities. As a consequence, moderately (Niger) or extremely (Benin) frag-
mented party systems emerged.
This explanation matches with our finding that bigger parties tend to be less ethnic than smaller 
ones. No political party with more than 20 per cent support in the surveys comes close to being 
an ethnic party. This partially confirms Fomunyoh’s view (2001) that big government parties are 
less ethnic than other parties. Yet we also find junior government parties that are strongly ethni-
cized (e.g. ANDP/Niger) and smaller opposition parties (e.g. Burkina’s UNIR/MS) that are not 
ethnic at all. 
One might also think that the type of electoral system has contributed to sustained ethnic or 
regionalist politics in Benin and Niger. However, the electoral systems of the most and the least 
ethnicized cases (Benin and Burkina Faso, respectively) are similar; they both have a proportional 
representation (PR) component in small to medium multimember constituencies. At the same time, 
Anglophone cases such as Kenya or Zambia which operate with the classical British plurality sys-
tems in single-member constituencies (‘first past the post’) are often seen as having highly ethni-
cized party systems. 
The strongest explanation for the differences between the cases probably derives from other 
social and political determinants of voting behaviour. In Mali and Burkina, so-called joking kinship 
effectively reduces the salience of ethnicity (Badini, 1996; Dunning and Harrison, 2010). Individual 
members of different ethnic groups consider themselves ‘cousins’ and regularly exchange jokes 
about each other when they meet, without raising tensions. This may indeed explain Mali’s (and 
possibly Burkina’s) exceptionalism.
Moreover, rationalist and socio-structural determinants of party preference other than ethnicity 
and region play a particular role in Mali and Burkina Faso. The logit regressions for most Malian 
and Burkinabè parties show ‘education’ and ‘urban residence’ to be statistically significant. 
Strikingly, almost all weakly ethnicized and regionalized parties show evidence for rationalist vot-
ing: 6 out of 7 weakly ethnicized parties indicate ‘satisfaction with the government’ to be a signifi-
cant determinant in the expected direction. Government parties and alliances enjoy more support 
from satisfied respondents whereas dissatisfaction increases the preference for opposition parties. 
 at Leibniz Inst Globale und Regionale Studien on February 3, 2014ips.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Basedau and Stroh 21
Conclusion
The findings of both the multivariate logit regressions as well as the bivariate statistics indicate that 
ethnicity as a determinant of support for political parties in Francophone Africa matters, but that the 
scope of impact is rather weak and differs with regard to cases. These findings corroborate results on 
the (limited) role of ethnicity as a determinant of voting behaviour in recent studies on (mostly) 
Anglophone African countries and, hence, they contribute to balancing a biased debate. A probably 
novel finding, however, is that the degree of ethnicization turns out to be even less convincing if we 
take a closer look at the support bases of the individual parties and if we compare ethnicity with region. 
The greater salience of ‘region’ compared with ‘ethnicity’ suggests that ties between voters and 
parties work through geographical proximity, which allows leaders to exploit personal networks in 
their region of origin rather than the idea of shared ethnic identity. Mainly, regional residents may 
benefit from locally determined, clientelistic distributional mechanisms. Such neopatrimonial and 
clientelistic ties deserve attention in the future study of party preference. 
When explaining the differences in the salience of ethnicity and regionalism between Benin and 
Niger on the one hand and Mali and Burkina Faso on the other hand, tentative causes include his-
torical legacies, sociocultural relationships, and rationalist voting behaviour. The role of ethnicity 
appears to depend on the mobilization strategies of elites rather than on the collective interests of 
identity groups. However, it must not be forgotten that the statistical models and bivariate research 
tools fall short in sufficiently explaining the determinants of party preference in at least one coun-
try case (Mali). Hence, it seems particularly fruitful to further investigate the interaction of elite 
behaviour with sociocultural phenomena such as ‘joking kinship’ and rationalist determinants, 
which are able to reduce or replace the impact of ethnicity and regionalism. 
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Notes
 1. For Kasfir (1976: 77) ‘ethnicity contains objective characteristics associated with common ancestry, 
such as language, territory, cultural practices and the like. These are perceived by both insiders and out-
siders as important indicators of identity, so that they can become the bases for mobilizing social solidar-
ity and which in certain situations result in political activity’.
 2. Inevitably, cut-off points appear somewhat arbitrary. While a comparative approach can hardly avoid this 
methodological problem, other scholars have set different thresholds (e.g. Scarritt, 2006).
 3. We define ‘ethnicization’ as a less radical concept that acknowledges ethnicity as one feature among 
others shaping a party system. According to our understanding, the term ‘ethnic party’ implies that a 
party is ethnic, while a party may be ‘ethnicized’ to different degrees.
 4. This attitudinal approach usually refers to an understanding of ‘ethnic parties’ used by Chandra (2004) 
in the Indian context.
 5. Today ‘Democratic Republic of Congo’.
 6. Alesina et al. (2003) fractionalization index values: Benin: 0.79, Burkina Faso: 0.74, Mali: 0.69, Niger: 
0.65 (range: 0–1).
 7. The survey question reads, ‘Quel est votre groupe ethnique?’
 8. Although this question may appear more neutral, it is prone to systematic distortions for educated people 
(using French) and traders (using larger African business languages). More sophisticated attempts to 
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measure an individual’s ethnic identity in the survey turned out to be much more problematic. Downplaying 
the importance of ethnic identities seems to be socially desirable (see Basedau and Stroh, 2008).
 9. An 80.3 per cent congruence of ethnic groups and their expected native languages increases to 94.4 per 
cent when the most important interethnic trade languages are accepted (Jula in Burkina Faso, Bambara 
in Mali, and Hausa in Niger), as well as French, as ‘right’ answers for all ethnic affiliations. Only a minor 
variance across countries occurs.
10. We use the parties’ acronyms in the main text. A comprehensive list of full party names is available at the 
GIGA website: http://www.giga-hamburg.de/african-parties/party-names 
11. Generally, we performed both enter and forward regressions. If not indicated otherwise, results of the 
enter method are reported.
12. Thus, our dependent variable is operationalized by the classic question, ‘Which political party would you 
vote for if there were to be parliamentary elections today?’ We had to abandon a robustness test with 
party identification (‘Do you feel close to a party? Which one?’) due to insufficient frequencies. However, 
87.1 per cent of party identifications are equal to the respondents’ voting intentions.
13. Region indicates the first subnational administrative level. The category of reference is the country’s 
region which comes closest to national averages. ‘Christian’ is the religious category of reference in 
Benin and Burkina Faso while Islamic affiliation is dichotomized in Mali and the religious variable is 
excluded from the Nigerien models due to a near completely Muslim society. Formal education is clus-
tered into seven categories running from ‘none’ to ‘doctoral degree’. Gender and urban vs. rural resi-
dence were simply dichotomized. Age is dichotomized along the youngest quartile. Satisfaction variables 
are dichotomized (rather satisfied or rather unsatisfied). Democratic attitudes are measured by an index 
including six survey questions on basic democratic values which builds an ordinal scale ranging from 0 
(very undemocratic) to 6 (very democratic). Further details are available from the authors upon request.
14. Multinomial regression models would have been an alternative. However, we follow Cohen et al. (2003: 
520) who argue that binary logit models in a ‘nested-dichotomies approach’ are easier to interpret. We 
calculated six models per political party using two statistical approaches: the automatic forward entering 
method and the simple enter method which forces the model to include all chosen variables. We com-
pared three models per method: one full model with all abovementioned variables and two excluding 
‘region’ and ‘ethnicity’ respectively. 
15. The danger of statistical interference with ethnic affiliations is low since in most cases the most 
geographically concentrated 80 per cent of one ethnic group is spread over three or four regional units.
16. Due to the large number of models we cannot report all of them. However, the full set is obtainable from 
the authors upon request.
17. We are well aware of the fact that Nagelkerke’s R² is no measure of ‘variance accounted for’ in a strict 
sense. However, it is a commonly reported figure. Moreover, it is a measure of the ‘null deviance 
accounted for’ by the model’s set of predictors. As the null deviance expresses the discrepancy from the 
worst possible to the best possible model, an increase in Nagelkerke’s R² clearly indicates an increase in 
explanatory power (cf. Cohen et al., 2003).
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